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Abstract
This paper provides a first quantitative assessment of the migration potential involving the
enlarged EU and its new neighbors. Based on new theoretical developments in migration
theories, it develops an empirical model which highlights the main migration determinants in
the EU. As a next step, the model is estimated with the Hausman and Taylor as well as the
GMM panel data estimators. The observed/fitted migration ratios are subsequently calculated
from an out−sample technique. Results show that there is still a significant migration
potential from Maghreb countries towards Southern European countries. A second significant
potential concerns the new Eastern neighbors with regard to Germany and Eastern EU
countries.
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1. Introduction 
 
On  May  1,  2004,  the  enlargement  of  the  European  Union  (EU)  to  Central  and  Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) pushed its frontiers away, further east and south. It now faces 
new neighbors, which are first Russia and the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), i.e. 
Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Southern Mediterranean countries (SMCs) are also included 
in the new neighbor group, since the EU enlargement to Malta and Cyprus.  
 
Taken together, these new neighbors add up to 410 million inhabitants. It is almost as much as 
the enlarged EU-25 (475 million people). However, the new neighbors face a GDP per capita 
which barely exceeds one-tenth of the EU-25.    
 
Given  these  differences  in  living  standards,  the  European  Commission  has  initiated  the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), in order to promote economic integration between the 
EU and its new neighbors. This policy’s final objective is to achieve a large single market 
with the free movement of goods, services, capital and also people (European Commission, 
2003, 2005).  
 
At the same time, EU citizens and policy makers have become increasingly concerned with 
migration flows into the EU originating from low and middle income countries (including 
these new neighbors). This concern is due not only to the ENP, but also because migration 
patterns have undergone significant changes in the past decade. In particular, the number of 
asylum applications has almost doubled during this period, and the proportion of unskilled 
migrants has also sharply increased (OECD, 2005; Pederson et al., 2004).  
 
Given  the  lack  of  quantitative  studies  concerning  the  migration  aspect  of  the  ENP,  the 
analysis proposed here is a first attempt to assess the migration potential between the new 
neighbors and the EU. Based on new developments in migration theory, this paper provides 
first a theoretical framework which simultaneously includes traditional and new migration 
determinants, such as border effects, welfare magnets or policy regulations. As a next step, an 
empirical model is implemented in order to calculate the migration potential from the new 
neighbors into the EU. This can be achieved through out-sample predictions from Hausman 




2.  A theoretical model on migration determinants 
 
In recent years, migration theory has undergone a considerable renewal. This renewal was 
first  initiated  by  Borjas’  (1987)  pioneer  work  on  self-selection.  It  has  subsequently  been 
extended or complemented by taking into account new factors which explain the migration 
decision. Several of them are of particular importance for the EU case. The first is welfare 
magnets (Borjas, 1999). It relies on the idea that once migrants are self-selected, they choose 
to cluster in the countries where the public assistance is the highest.  
 
Particular attention has also been given to migration costs. Specifically, it has been shown that 
border effects play a significant role in the migration decision (Helliwell, 1997; Hunt and 
Mueller, 2004). As a result, it is expected that all things being equal, crossing a frontier 
strongly  reduces  migration  compared  to  moving  within  a  country.  Human  or  business 
networks are an additional new migration cost recently included in migration theory (Lalonde   2 
and  Topel,  1997).  They  simply  reflect  the  fact  that  people  lose  some  family,  friends  or 
business ties when migrating. This cost can be reduced if the migrant is able to meet part of 
his family abroad, or if he has developed business links in the destination country. 
 
Finally, migration policies can also be introduced into migration theories: for example, it is 
expected  that  policy  makers  wish  to  control  the  number  of  migrants  into  the  destination 
country  through  quotas,  or  select  them  according  to  the  labor  market’s  needs  (Benhabib, 
1996).  
 
The  model  developed  below  takes  into  account  the  new  developments  briefly  described 
above. Its presentation follows Borjas’ spirit and is close to Hatton and Williamson (2005) or 
Clark and al. (2002), but extends this work by including additional migration costs, such as 
border effects, business ties as well as specific monetary costs (cost of living) or indirect costs 
(unemployment). 
 
Basically, the decision of individual i in source country s to migrate to destination country d 
(misd) depends on the earning difference between the destination and the source country, net of 
the migration costs. 
 
 
misd ￿ ￿Wid ￿Tid￿￿￿Wis ￿Tis￿￿Cisd   (1) 
 
Wid and Tid correspond to the destination country’s wages and social transfers for individual i; 
in the same way, Wis and Tis reflect the source country’s wages and transfers, whereas Cisd 
denotes the migration costs born by individual i who migrates from country s to country d. 
 
Wid ￿ ￿d ￿￿dSi 
   Wis ￿ ￿s ￿￿sSi     (2) 
 
Wages are assumed to include two components: an average base for workers (ad ans as) as 
well as a component which depends on returns to skills (bd and bs). It is also assumed that 
wages have means and variances respectively equal to mwd, mws, swd, sws and that Cov(Wid, 
Wis)>0. 
 
Migration costs (equation 3) depend first on direct and indirect location costs (Csd), such as 
the geographic distance between the source and the destination country (Dsd), the difference in 
languages between the two countries (Lsd), the country difference in the cost of living (Hsd), 
border effects (Bsd), country differences in unemployment rates (Usd) as well as the lack of 
business ties (N
B
sd). All these costs are assumed to be the same for all the individuals. In 
addition, there are individual-specific costs (Cisd), which generally refer to the lack of family 
abroad  or  other  psychic  costs.  These  costs  are  supposed  to  have  a  mean  and  a  variance 
respectively equal to mn, and sn. Finally, migration policies (P) may also be introduced in the 
migration  cost  variable  (Ps,  Pd),  since  a  restrictive  home  or  destination  country’s  policy 
implies  additional  costs  (queuing,  monetary  costs,  etc.).  It  is  supposed  here  that  the 
destination country’s migration policy is not skill-selective, as in the EU. As a result, and for 
empirical purposes, Pd is an exogenous variable. 
 
Cisd ￿ Csd￿Dsd,Bsd,Lsd,Hsd,Nsd
B,Usd￿￿Cisd ￿P￿Ps,Pd￿  (3) 
   3 
Substituting (2) and (3) into (1) and summing for all individuals, the emigration rate between 









  (4) 
 
Where F is a standard normal distribution. 
 
The calculation of the migration function’s partial derivatives provides the following results. 
First, the emigration rate increases with the destination country’s average income and social 
transfers; in the same way, it decreases with the source country’s income and transfers. It 
decreases as well with all migration costs. In addition, in line with Borjas’ self-selection 
models, migration is an inverse U-shape function of the source country income inequality, 
provided that the destination country is richer and initially more income unequal than the 
source country
1. In the same way, migration is an inverse U-shape function of the destination 
country’s income inequality, provided that this country is richer but initially more equal than 
the source country
2. As a consequence, it may be shown that if the destination country is 
richer and the source country initially more equal (sws< swd), then migration first increases 
with the source to destination country’s income inequality (sws/ swd), up to the point where 




3. The empirical model and the calculation of migration potentials 
 
 




















P ￿￿b8Pdt ￿b9Pst 
￿￿s ￿￿d ￿￿t ￿￿sdt              (5) 
 
The dependent variable Msdt is the gross emigration rate into the 18 OECD members’ EU 
destination  countries
3,  from  67  source  countries
4,  during  the  period  1993-2002.  The 
emigration  rate  is  calculated  as  the  migration  flows  from  country  s  to  country  d  as  a 
proportion  of  the  source  country’s  population.  Statistical  data  are  collected  from  OECD 
                                                 
1 Indeed, if ￿wd ￿￿ws￿Ts ￿Td ￿Csd￿Dsd,Bsd,Lsd,Hsd,Nsd
B,Usd￿￿P￿Ps,Pd￿￿￿n and swd> sws, then 
￿Msd
￿￿ws ￿ 0 up to 
sws=swd;  
2 In this case, if swd< sws, then
￿Msd
￿￿wd ￿ 0
 up to swd=sws. For additional details, refer to Hatton and Williamson 
(2005). 
3 These are each EU-15 country, with Belgium and Luxembourg accounting for a single country, in addition to 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republic. 
4 They include the 18 EU countries mentioned above as well as the USA, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, Israel, Japan, 
Australia, New-Zealand, China, South Korea, Hong-Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 
India, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Gulf countries and the new neighbors described in the introduction.   4 
(2005) and CARIM (2005). Given that some authors suggest using the stock of migrants 
instead of the flows (Brucker and Schroder, 2005), we will also use migrant stocks in the 
calculation of an alternative dependent variable.  
 
The first line in equation (5) corresponds to the income and transfers migration determinants. 
The first term reflects the destination to source country’s GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity adjusted), with a1 expected to be positive. The parameters a2 and a3 refer to the impact 
of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient of household income or consumption 
in each country (source: United Nations 2005). As stated previously, it is expected that a2 and 
a3  are  positive  and  negative  respectively.  The  following  term  in  line  1  denotes  welfare 
transfers in the destination country as a proportion of the source country (a4>0). It is measured 
by the total public spending offered in each country. The corresponding data come from the 
Luxembourg income study (LIS, 2005). Finally, line 1 in equation (5) also includes a poverty 
constraint (POVs). The reason for introducing this variable is the following: we have shown 
previously  that  the  lower  the  income  in  the  source  country,  the  higher  the  migration. 
However,  when  the  income  level  is  actually  too  low,  people  cannot  migrate  any  longer, 
simply  because  they  cannot  bear  the  monetary  migration  costs  of  migrating.  As  a 
consequence, a5 is expected to be negative.  
 
The second line includes the various migration costs aforementioned. The bilateral distance 
between countries s and d has been calculated from a index of inter-city distances, weighted 
by the share of each city in the overall country’s population (CEPII, 2004). This weighted 
distance index presents the advantage of taking into account the spatial distribution of the 
population within each country.  
 
Border effects are measured by a dummy which is equal to zero for migration within countries 
(internal migrations) and unity for migration across countries (international migrations). The 
inclusion of this variable requires the calculation of internal distances and internal migrations. 
The former is directly derived from the CEPII distance index, in the same way as international 
distances,  whereas  the  latter  is  measured  from  the  internal  migration  data  provided  by 
Eurostat (2005) and OECD (2000). 
 
The difference in languages is also proxied by a dummy variable, which is equal to zero if 
two countries speak the same language, and unity otherwise. 
 
The cost of living ratio is measured as the total cost of living in the main cities in each country 
(the statistical source is Mercer, 2005). Identically, the unemployment ratio accounts for the 
difference in unemployment rates between the destination and the source country. The data is 
derived from ILO (2005). 
 





The  former  is  proxied by  the  total  bilateral  trade between  country  s  and  country  d.  It  is 
expected that the higher the trade flows between these countries, the closer the business links 
and as a result, an ensuing higher level of migration (b6>0). In the same way, private networks 
are measured by the lagged stock of migrants. For these two variables, the data is derived 
from OECD (2005) and Source OECD (2005) respectively. 
 
The final variables included in line 2 correspond to policy regulations. With regard to the 
source country’s policy, it is proxied by the index of civil and political deprivation of rights 
(the statistical source is Freedom House, 2005). It is generally expected that the deprivation of   5 
freedom may encourage people to escape from their home country. As a result, b9 is expected 
to be positive. Turning to the destination country’s policy regulation, it is measured by two 
alternative  proxies:  the  first  is  the  total  number  of  residence  permits  delivered  by  each 
destination  country,  as  a  proportion  of  the  world  population  (source:  OECD,  2005).  The 
higher this number, the less restrictive the migration policy and thus the higher the migration 
(b8>0). As an alternative, we also use a dummy which is equal to one for migration flows 
within  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA),  because  only  this  area  provides  the  free 
movement of people. Conversely, the proxy is equal to zero for all migration flows across the 
EEA frontier. 
 
The  final  line  in  equation  (5)  includes  the  specific  effects  related  to  the  source  and  the 
destination country as well as time effects. These effects are expected to take into account any 
omitted variable. They may be considered as fixed or random depending on the econometric 
specification of the model. 
 
Preliminary estimations with the Within estimator provide significant Wald tests (refer to the 
note in Table 1). This means that the specific effects referred to previously are all significant 
at the 1% level. However, the Within estimator cannot be used in the final model, since there 
are many time-invariant variables, especially migration costs. Given that the Hausman test 
indicates a correlation between the residuals and some independent variables, the standard 
GLS or FGLS random effect estimators can neither be used in the final estimation. In order to 
solve  this  problem,  we  suggest  using  the  Hausman  and  Taylor  estimator,  as  also 
recommended by other authors in this case (Egger, 2004, Greene, 2003). Its main advantage is 
to make the estimation of the time-invariant parameters possible without any bias due to the 
correlation of the residuals.  
 
Results are presented in Table 1. All the parameters are significant at the 5% level and present 
the expected sign, with the exception of the source country’s policy regulation, which shows a 
negative sign. This however, may be explained by the fact that the deprivation of freedom 
may impede people from escaping their countries, especially because this deprivation is very 
often supplemented by police controls or fear policies. 
 
All  the  other  variables  show  the  expected  sign:  an  increase  in  the  destination  to  source 
country’s GDP ratio increases migration. In the same way, a rise in the public spending ratio 
increases migration into the destination country. Moreover, the source to destination country’s 
income inequality ratio first pushes migration up, before reducing it. As a result, a2 and a3 are 
respectively  positive  and  negative,  as  theoretically  expected.  Migration  costs  also  matter, 
since the parameters corresponding to distance, border, differences in languages, differences 
in unemployment or in the cost or living are all significant and negative. In addition, both 
private and business networks increase migrations, by reducing migration costs. Finally, the 
destination country’s migration policy also increases migration as the number of residence 
permits delivered to the migrants increases. The alternative HT estimation with the policy 
dummy provides very similar results. 
 
The last two columns in Table 1 provide an estimation of the model with the stock of migrants 
used in the calculation of the emigration rate. Since the lagged stock of migrants is also 
included as an independent variable (which reflects human networks), the model becomes 
dynamic. In order to tackle the problem of the correlation between the residuals and some 
independent  variables,  the  Arrelano,  Bond  and  Bover’s  GMM  estimator  has  been 
implemented  (Arellano  and  Bond,  1998;  Arellano  and  Bover,  1995).  The  sign  and  the   6 
significance of the parameters are very close to those provided by the static HT model and 
thus corroborate the results found above. 
 
The final step consists in calculating the EU migration potential from the new neighbors. This 
has been first carried out from the dynamic GMM model (Table 2). The choice of the GMM 
as the reference model is motivated by the fact that migration stocks are generally more stable 
over time than migration flows, which can undergo more important variations from one year 
to another. However, as a sensitivity analysis, the potential of migration flows has also been 
calculated  from  the  HT  model  (Table  3).  Results  are  not  significantly  different,  although 
slightly more volatile during the time period considered, as expected
5. 
 
Tables 2 (Table 3) provides the actual/fitted migration stock (flows) ratio in percent. This 
ratio is used as a measure for the migration potential between each source and destination 
countries. It has been calculated with the out-sample technique which is very often used in 
international trade or migration models (Péridy, 2005, Alvarez et al., 2003). Several features 
emerge  from  this  Table.  First,  there  is  a  significant  migration  potential  from  Maghreb 
countries  to  Southern  European  countries,  especially  France,  Spain  and  Italy.  For  these 
countries, the actual stock of migrants from the Maghreb barely exceeds 50% of the fitted 
values. This result is very important. It shows that although the stock of migrants from the 
Maghreb  is  already  the  most  important  in  these  Southern  European  countries  (given  the 
geographic and the language proximity as well as the significant differences in the living 
standards and unemployment), there is still a large potential for an additional increase. The 
fact that the actual migration stock (and flows)  from these countries has not reached the fitted 
levels may at least partly be due to the restrictive migration policy implemented by France, 
Spain and Italy in the past decade, in order to control migration flows from these countries
6.  
 
Germany,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  are  also  facing  a  significant  migration 
potential from Maghreb countries, but to a lesser extent. Conversely, the observed migration 
stocks or flows from the Maghreb to Northern (and Eastern) European countries are generally 
close to the fitted values. This means that there is no potential for additional migration into 
these countries. This may be explained by much less restrictive specific migration policies in 
the past decade. 
 
A second group of source countries is made of Mashrek countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria). For these countries, the observed to fitted migration ratios are generally close to 100% 
or above. This suggests that there is also no migration potential from these countries. The only 
exception concerns migration from Egypt to Italy (82%) and from Lebanon to several EU 
countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark). 
 
Israel is a specific country for which the observed/fitted migration ratios are above 100%. 
This suggests that there are more actual migrants from Israel into the EU than predicted. This 
may  be  easily  explained  by  historical  factors.  In  particular,  although  the  Israel  policy 
                                                 
5 In order to save space, results are not presented for each year. The complete set of results is available upon 
request. 
6 As already stated, the destination country’s policy variable included in the model reflects the total number of 
residence permits which are delivered by each destination country for all source countries taken together. Hence, 
it does not reflect the number of permits delivered to each source country specifically. This is why the difference 
between the fitted and the observed migration stock in Southern European countries, originating from Maghreb 
countries, may be explained by this specific migration policy.   7 
encourages return migration, there are still a significant number of people originating from 
Israel living in EU countries. 
 
Finally, Russia and the WNIS show an actual/fitted migration ratio which is above 100% with 
Northern European countries. Conversely, it is well below 100% with regard to Germany and 
the WNIS to a lesser extent. It is close to 100% for the other EU countries.  
 
To sum up, it is striking to observe that there are two significant migration potential areas: the 
first concerns Maghreb countries with regards to Southern EU countries. The second is Russia 
and the WNIS with regards to the CEECs and above all Germany. This means that unless 
there is a rapid convergence process between these new neighbors and the EU, relaxing the 
specific migration policies in some EU countries may significantly increase migration flows 
in the areas described above. 
 
Another  striking  feature  is  that  the  migration  potential  also  differs  according  to  the  EU 
destination countries, whatever the source country: as a matter of fact, the last column of 
Tables  2  and  3  indicates  that  Northern  EU  countries  have  generally  above-average 
actual/fitted  migration  stock  ratios,  whereas  France,  Germany  and  Italy  show  lower  than 
average ratios. As already said, this may be explained by the fact that these latter countries are 
closer to the new Southern or Eastern neighbors. As a result, they have implemented tighter 
migration policies in order to control migration flows. 
 
 These results challenge the EU policy in several ways: firstly, it seems crucial to provide 
more economic cooperation between the EU and its new neighbors as a means of reducing the 
gap in the living standards and the macroeconomic performance (unemployment). This would 
reduce the migration pressure (potential) to some extent. At the same time, it seems important 
for EU countries to coordinate their migration policies, with common objectives concerning 
illegal migration, skilled migrants, etc… As a final step and in the long run only, the EU will 
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Table 1: Estimation Results 
 
Description Variable HT (1) HT(2) GMM(1) GMM (2)
GDP Ydt/Yst 0.0051*** 0.0048*** 0.0069*** 0.0075**
Gini sYdt/sYst 0.102** 0.098** 0.098** 0.087**
Gini
2 (sYdt/sYs)
2 -0.070** -0.059** -0.93** -0.100***
public spending Td/Ts 0.828D04*** 0.850D04*** 0.989D04*** 0.942D-04***
Poverty constraint POVs -0.0478*** -0.0466*** -0.0487*** -0.0465***
Distance Dsd -0.00014*** -0.00014*** -0.00015*** -0.00015***
Border effects Bsd -4.542*** -4.545*** -1.462*** -1.511***
Destination country's migration policy Pdt (residence permits) 3.399*** 7.591***
Pdt (dummy) 0.440*** 0.099****
Source country's migration policy Pst  -0.0214*** -0.0218*** -0.0077* -0.0103**
Differences in language Lsd -0.3776*** -0.3422*** -1.9833*** -1.8705***
Cost of living Hd/Hs -1.351*** -1.349*** -1.015*** -1.136***
Unemployment Ud/Us -0.1096*** -0.1033*** -0.0907*** -0.0934***
Business ties N
B
sdt 0.251D-05*** 0.248D-05*** 0.189D-05*** 0.193D-05***
Human networks N
P
sdt 103.663*** 107.711*** 0.0894*** 0.0899***
Constant -5.096*** -5.132*** -3.054*** -3.096***
R2 (adjusted) 0.893 0.888 0.993 0.993
number of observations 12060 12060 10248 10248
Hausman and Taylor  test (theta) 0.99 0.99 - -
***) significant at a 1% level; **) significant at a 5% level; *) significant at a 10% level.
LM test: 22510.1***
Wald tests: country s (as): 2356.5***; country d (bd): 10585.7***;  time effect (gt): 18.3*
Hausman test: 665.8***  
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Table 2: actual/fitted stocks of migrants in EU countries from the new neighbors (%) 
 
Israel Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria Russia Ukraine Moldavia Belarus All
France 85,8 57,1 50,7 60,5 92,7 97,7 66,3 97,2 99,1 120,9 101,5 111,9 92,1
Belgium 122,8 103,4 67,3 86,4 108,5 117,1 95,9 126,4 114,2 126,2 106,3 117,4 109,8
Germany 95,3 80,7 68,3 68,6 90,2 97,3 77,4 96,9 78,0 77,3 76,7 88,1 81,1
Italy 104,3 75,6 54,2 60,9 82,8 105,9 100,1 115,9 89,0 80,8 102,3 112,0 84,7
Netherlands 121,3 96,4 57,7 89,6 107,3 115,8 110,7 125,0 102,8 115,9 121,0 131,2 103,3
UK 101,9 87,9 81,0 76,7 96,0 96,9 91,3 107,4 106,1 103,3 101,1 111,7 99,4
Ireland 119,3 111,6 103,6 101,4 124,2 114,0 108,6 123,1 122,6 142,9 119,0 128,8 122,3
Denmark 118,9 103,5 85,3 93,2 111,1 113,6 84,3 123,1 120,7 123,0 118,9 130,3 114,1
Finland 116,8 110,9 102,2 101,3 121,7 111,7 106,0 121,0 91,9 108,9 116,8 128,1 105,6
Sweden 120,9 104,7 96,0 94,2 112,6 115,3 70,3 124,9 106,9 137,1 120,9 132,9 112,0
Austria 125,1 96,9 88,5 86,3 110,2 119,3 113,3 128,8 126,2 150,2 124,7 134,8 119,8
Spain 109,5 82,2 50,1 68,2 90,6 104,0 98,1 113,5 125,8 96,9 107,3 117,2 102,6
Greece 121,9 109,7 100,7 100,7 90,5 116,2 69,7 85,5 95,5 94,9 96,2 104,7 96,4
Czech Rep 112,6 107,9 99,4 98,4 117,4 107,4 102,0 116,3 100,7 76,7 74,4 89,3 101,7
Hungary 93,7 116,1 106,8 107,1 117,9 107,4 102,0 96,8 101,4 93,4 86,8 87,7 104,5
Poland 101,2 106,2 97,7 97,0 108,3 96,3 91,1 105,8 90,7 93,4 76,1 69,0 96,5
Slovak Rep. 112,8 116,5 107,3 107,4 118,1 107,7 102,2 116,5 94,3 100,8 77,5 87,4 104,0
Tot. EU 110,8 98,1 83,3 88,1 105,9 108,4 93,5 113,2 103,9 108,4 101,6 110,7 102,9 
 
 
Table 3: actual/fitted flows of migrants in EU countries from the new neighbors (%) 
 
Israel Algeria Morocco Tunisia Egypt Jordan Lebanon Syria Russia Ukraine Moldavia Belarus All
France 86,5 74,0 69,2 69,7 92,1 96,0 71,4 96,3 97,4 116,2 99,1 108,0 93,7
Belgium 118,4 94,7 64,7 86,2 106,3 113,1 94,1 122,6 110,4 120,7 102,9 112,6 105,9
Germany 92,2 80,4 70,3 71,4 88,5 93,9 77,7 94,1 70,9 73,3 78,1 86,4 77,5
Italy 101,1 77,6 58,3 63,8 73,5 102,6 97,4 112,4 88,4 82,2 99,3 107,5 83,0
Netherlands 118,4 95,7 69,4 89,8 106,2 113,2 108,0 121,8 101,1 100,0 117,5 127,0 100,9
UK 99,7 87,6 81,8 78,7 95,1 95,2 90,3 105,2 102,9 100,6 98,6 107,7 97,5
Ireland 117,3 110,1 103,2 100,8 123,3 112,3 107,1 121,8 120,1 139,6 116,5 125,6 120,4
Denmark 116,3 102,4 86,1 93,1 110,0 111,2 85,0 121,2 117,6 119,3 115,6 126,1 111,9
Finland 114,8 109,8 102,1 100,8 120,8 109,9 104,6 119,5 93,3 114,8 114,2 128,0 106,5
Sweden 117,4 102,9 95,4 93,5 110,8 112,2 80,2 122,0 100,1 131,7 116,8 127,7 107,9
Austria 121,1 95,8 88,7 86,7 108,2 115,7 110,1 125,5 122,1 144,5 120,1 129,5 116,6
Spain 105,8 81,1 56,5 72,0 107,9 100,9 95,8 110,2 120,8 87,7 103,6 112,3 102,9
Greece 119,4 108,6 100,8 100,4 82,5 114,1 74,0 87,1 86,7 91,2 95,9 103,5 91,1
Czech Rep 111,5 107,5 99,8 98,6 117,8 106,6 101,5 115,7 91,0 82,3 77,8 90,4 98,8
Hungary 85,1 115,6 107,1 106,8 117,8 105,3 101,4 97,3 104,9 85,7 88,0 87,7 104,7
Poland 101,0 105,9 98,5 97,3 108,3 96,4 91,7 105,7 92,8 79,0 79,5 74,1 95,7
Slovak Rep. 111,8 115,9 107,6 107,2 118,0 107,0 101,8 116,0 95,5 93,0 80,4 88,6 103,4
Tot. EU 108,1 98,0 85,9 89,2 105,1 106,2 93,7 111,4 100,9 103,6 100,2 108,4 101,1 
 
 